Countries contribute to UN peacekeeping missions for a variety of reasons. That diversion of interest affects how the operations’ mandates are fulfilled. While some troop-providers align with the UN’s ideals and directives, others act in favor of their private benefits. Drawing on the conflict-of-interest theory, I posit that divergent interests within peacekeeping operations reduce the ideational commitment of troop-providers to the UN; therefore, the functionality of UN peacekeeping missions. This article explores the effect of troop-providers’ ideational commitment to the UN on reducing civilian victimization by the combatants in all terminated and ongoing peacekeeping operations from 1990 to 2019. The results show that an increase in troop-providers’ ideational commitment to the UN reduces civilian victimization. The article makes three contributions. First, it elaborates on the consequences of how peacekeeping operations are composed, bringing in the primary motivations of troop-providers. Second, it develops a new measure of troop-providers’ ideational commitment to the UN, taking into account their human rights stance in the UNGA. Third, the study suggests that troop-providers’ ideational commitment to the UN becomes more pivotal in large deployments; thus, it outlines several policy implications to the UN.