

Election Accomplished: Democracies and the  
Timing of Peacekeeper Drawdowns  
**-Online Appendix-**

This Appendix includes descriptive statistics for our data, information about the dynamics of troop contributions, and a series of robustness checks not included in the main text. The robustness tests yield the following results:

- Our results are robust to disaggregation of peacekeepers according to type for our outcome variable.
- Our results are robust to controlling for the number of formally-authorized personnel by the UN Security Council.
- Our results are robust to controlling for elections in troop-providers.
- Our results are robust to controlling for the real GDP of troop-providers.
- Our results remain substantively identical when token contributors are omitted from the sample.
- The alternative approach of interacting regime types with violence against peacekeepers does not explain the peacekeeper drawdowns.

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Mission-level variables					
Statistic	Number of observations	Mean	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Proportion of democracies	4,138	0.6	0.2	0.0	1.0
Total number of TCCs	4,138	31.1	17.5	1	72
Non-democratic TCCs	4,138	13.2	8.9	0	32
Democratic TCCs	4,138	17.9	9.8	0	43
Post-election	4,138	0.6	0.5	0	1
Civilian protection	4,138	0.3	0.4	0	1
Casualties	4,087	0.2	1.1	0.0	43.0
Government effectiveness	3,196	−1.1	0.6	−2.5	0.3
Political stability	3,220	−1.4	0.8	−2.8	0.5
Pop growth	4,138	1.1	2.2	−9.0	5.5
Military expenditures	3,071	0.7	1.5	−7.4	3.5
GDP per capita	3,830	6.9	1.1	4.6	9.2
Integrated missions	4,138	0.7	0.5	0	1
New missions	4,138	0.1	0.5	0	9
Total violence	4,056	1.8	2.4	0.0	13.1
Contributor-level variables					
Statistic	Number of observations	Mean	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Total peacekeepers	128,423	144.3	460.8	0.0	9,779.0
Observers	127,073	4.2	7.3	0.0	791.0
Troops	127,072	121.6	442.6	0.0	9,769.0
Police	127,074	19.7	58.8	0.0	845.0
Post-election	131,070	0.6	0.5	0	1
Polity score	128,636	5.5	5.1	−10.0	10.0
Democracy	128,636	0.6	0.5	0.0	1.0
Distance	131,070	8.5	0.7	4.8	9.9
Military spending	99,591	0.6	1.6	−7.4	3.5
GDP per capita	122,032	6.8	0.9	4.6	9.2
Integrated missions	131,070	0.8	0.4	0	1
Refugees	130,251	11.3	2.7	0.0	15.2
Population growth	131,070	1.3	2.1	−9.0	5.5
Casualties	128,951	0.01	0.2	0.0	25.0
Civilian protection	131,070	0.3	0.5	0	1
EU member	131,070	0.2	0.4	0	1
AU member	131,070	0.3	0.4	0	1
New missions	131,070	0.1	0.4	0	9
Total violence	128,373	1.7	2.3	0.0	13.1
Six-months to TCC election	131,070	0.03	0.2	0	1
One-year to TCC election	131,070	0.1	0.2	0	1

Table A1: Descriptive Statistics

## Testing Parallel Trend Assumptions

The empirical analysis provided in Table A2 further validates the parallel trend assumption that emerges visually from Figure 1 in the main text. While the similar slopes are apparent in Figure 1, we go a step further by examining the contributions of advanced democracies relative to election timing. To that end, we regress the count of peacekeepers on time ( $t$ ) relative to the first election, binary democracy control and the interaction term between time and democracy over both pre-election and post-election samples. The results show that the slopes of democracies and non-democracies are not significantly different from one another in the pre-election phase, but in the post-election era, the interaction is significant. This is in line with the pattern that emerges graphically in Figure 1.

	Count of Peacekeepers	
	<i>Pre-election</i>	<i>Post-election</i>
Time	1.701** (0.735)	1.459*** (0.423)
Democracy	-132.765*** (7.345)	-131.063*** (4.234)
Democracy × Time	1.400 (1.039)	-3.647*** (0.599)
Constant	261.296*** (5.194)	243.776*** (2.994)
Observations	26	26
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.982	0.995

*Note:* \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A2: Contributions relative to election timing

## **Bivariate Regression Analysis**

As can be seen in Table A1 above, some of the confounders that we include in the empirical models reported in the manuscript suffer from data missingness. For that reason, we end up having only 94,124 number of observations in the main models reported in the manuscript. It is important, however, to check whether our results would be consistent over the full sample. To minimize the issue of data limitation, we repeat the main model excluding the confounders. Table A3 reports the results of the bivariate regression analyses with contributor-mission fixed effects. We capture statistically significant negative effect for the interaction terms in all models.

	Count of Peacekeepers		Count of Peacekeepers -Smoothed-	
Post-election	41.765*** (2.791)	45.442*** (2.950)	45.934*** (2.861)	49.897*** (3.024)
Polity score		5.726*** (0.470)		5.947*** (0.480)
Polity × post-election	-4.670*** (0.377)		-4.967*** (0.386)	
Democracy		7.912 (5.104)		7.400 (5.203)
Democracy × post-election		-46.439*** (3.977)		-49.553*** (4.076)
Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	126,014	126,014	118,347	118,347
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.724	0.724	0.743	0.743

*Note:* \*p<0.1; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01

Table A3: Difference-in-Difference Analysis with Fixed Effects



## Contribution Dynamics

While our theory is not explicit about the dynamics of withdrawal, it does present some implications for timing. Given that we view elections as opportunities for withdrawal, we would expect democratic states to take advantage relatively quickly. To examine the dynamics in a bit greater detail, we run supplementary analyses in which we compare troop levels at various points to pre-election levels. Table A17 compares country-level contributions in the first three months following an election to average levels preceding the election.<sup>1</sup> While the interaction term is negative and significant, as expected, we can see that the marginal effect is actually slightly positive. This is not necessarily surprising, as there are often tasks to be done in the immediate aftermath, such as preparing for runoffs or dealing with potential spoilers. Moreover, it can be difficult for countries to organize a safe and orderly withdrawal in a short time frame. These safety concerns are why the War Powers Resolution, for example, provides the U.S. president with additional time to withdraw troops if he fails to secure Congressional approval.

We begin to see withdrawal dynamics in the second ninety days following the election. As Table A18 demonstrates, we still see a substantially larger effect for democracies (our interaction term), and the marginal effect is now negative. This means that the drawdown really begins in months four through six. We see not only the removal of the new peacekeepers brought in during the immediate post-election months, but a negative marginal effect relative to pre-election levels as well.

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<sup>1</sup>We drop all country-months not within our comparison ranges.

	Count of Peacekeepers		Count of Peacekeepers -Smoothed-	
Post-election (1-3 months)	39.677*** (5.937)	39.621*** (6.428)	45.679*** (5.891)	45.650*** (6.383)
Polity score	1.559** (0.790)		1.503* (0.795)	
Polity × Post-election (1-3 months)	-3.165*** (0.797)		-3.495*** (0.794)	
Democracy		26.857*** (9.315)		30.291*** (9.402)
Democracy × Post-election (1-3 months)		-28.935*** (8.522)		-32.042*** (8.493)
Military expenditures	99.373*** (3.900)	99.214*** (3.900)	97.737*** (4.056)	97.577*** (4.056)
Cost of soldier	26.762*** (3.831)	26.270*** (3.831)	29.073*** (3.844)	28.526*** (3.845)
Refugees	7.781** (3.210)	7.691** (3.211)	5.376 (3.343)	5.204 (3.344)
Casualties	147.959*** (9.417)	148.061*** (9.417)	145.365*** (9.357)	145.444*** (9.356)
Population growth	44.194*** (3.368)	43.779*** (3.370)	44.674*** (3.369)	44.246*** (3.370)
New missions	-5.871** (2.932)	-5.909** (2.931)	-7.061** (2.917)	-7.103** (2.917)
Total violence	-5.790*** (0.836)	-5.735*** (0.836)	-4.625*** (0.844)	-4.559*** (0.844)
Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	32,329	32,329	30,498	30,498
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.822	0.822	0.833	0.833

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A4: Effect on peacekeeper contributions among TCCs (1–3 months after election)

	Count of Peacekeepers		Count of Peacekeepers -Smoothed-	
Post-election (4-6 months)	38.183*** (6.549)	36.444*** (7.016)	45.659*** (6.406)	44.205*** (6.862)
Polity score	1.713** (0.789)		1.759** (0.788)	
Polity × Post-election (4-6 months)	-4.557*** (0.884)		-4.440*** (0.865)	
Democracy		28.352*** (9.284)		31.164*** (9.341)
Democracy × Post-election (4-6 months)		-38.984*** (9.309)		-38.454*** (9.103)
Military expenditures	94.805*** (3.884)	94.598*** (3.884)	93.196*** (4.027)	92.995*** (4.027)
Cost of soldier	26.933*** (3.803)	26.326*** (3.803)	28.792*** (3.800)	28.149*** (3.801)
Refugees	11.013*** (3.277)	10.925*** (3.278)	7.493** (3.314)	7.354** (3.315)
Casualties	138.390*** (9.601)	138.198*** (9.602)	132.978*** (9.526)	132.759*** (9.527)
Population growth	42.359*** (3.361)	41.874*** (3.364)	42.687*** (3.356)	42.190*** (3.357)
New missions	-8.431*** (2.944)	-8.417*** (2.944)	-6.576** (2.927)	-6.562** (2.926)
Total violence	-6.982*** (0.821)	-6.938*** (0.822)	-5.748*** (0.826)	-5.696*** (0.826)
Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	32,166	32,166	30,426	30,426
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.821	0.821	0.832	0.832

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A5: Effect on peacekeeper contributions among TCCs (4–6 months after election)

## Disaggregating Peacekeeping Types

The empirical models that we report in the main text use *total number of peacekeepers* as the dependent variable. While we capture findings in the expected direction in those models, it is important to see whether the results are driven by a particular peacekeeper type (e.g., troops, police, or observers). To alleviate such concerns, we disaggregate peacekeeper types along these lines and repeat the empirical analysis for each type.

Table A6 examines advanced democratic troop-providers' behavior in the post-election phase using contributor-mission fixed effects. We capture statistically significant negative results for each peacekeeper type.

	Count of Troops			Count of Troops -Smoothed-			Count of Police			Count of Police -Smoothed-			Count of Observers			Count of Observers -Smoothed-		
Post-election	15.509*** (3.146)	14.110*** (3.318)	19.446*** (3.198)	18.461*** (3.370)	7.088*** (0.443)	7.776*** (0.468)	8.047*** (0.446)	8.973*** (0.470)	0.011 (0.058)	0.093 (0.061)	0.126** (0.053)	0.170*** (0.056)						
Polity score	3.091*** (0.512)		3.087*** (0.521)		0.474*** (0.072)		0.501*** (0.073)		0.122*** (0.009)		0.123*** (0.009)							
Polity × post-election	-3.350*** (0.427)		-3.635*** (0.435)		-0.698*** (0.060)		-0.735*** (0.061)		-0.078*** (0.008)		-0.079*** (0.007)							
Democracy		-27.892*** (5.528)		-25.357*** (5.609)		3.951*** (0.779)		4.925*** (0.783)		0.705*** (0.102)		0.597*** (0.094)						
Democracy × post-election		-24.975*** (4.488)		-28.638*** (4.561)		-7.707*** (0.632)		-8.537*** (0.636)		-0.837*** (0.083)		-0.760*** (0.076)						
Military expenditure	21.274*** (1.873)	21.818*** (1.873)	18.708*** (1.922)	19.236*** (1.922)	6.317*** (0.264)	6.356*** (0.264)	6.402*** (0.268)	6.444*** (0.268)	0.478*** (0.034)	0.480*** (0.035)	0.390*** (0.032)	0.392*** (0.032)						
Refugees	18.596*** (0.596)	18.742*** (0.596)	18.400*** (0.595)	18.525*** (0.595)	1.674*** (0.084)	1.680*** (0.084)	1.611*** (0.083)	1.615*** (0.083)	0.164*** (0.011)	0.166*** (0.011)	0.152*** (0.010)	0.153*** (0.010)						
Casualties	198.218*** (6.811)	197.843*** (6.808)	200.960*** (6.829)	200.605*** (6.826)	3.270*** (0.959)	3.268*** (0.959)	3.604*** (0.953)	3.604*** (0.952)	1.224*** (0.125)	1.219*** (0.125)	1.103*** (0.114)	1.098*** (0.114)						
Civilian protection	76.308*** (4.004)	76.211*** (3.996)	68.457*** (4.044)	68.116*** (4.035)	14.875*** (0.564)	14.696*** (0.563)	14.703*** (0.564)	14.518*** (0.563)	-1.081*** (0.074)	-1.070*** (0.074)	-1.270*** (0.067)	-1.256*** (0.067)						
Population growth	24.933*** (1.571)	25.026*** (1.570)	24.722*** (1.582)	24.795*** (1.581)	2.360*** (0.221)	2.352*** (0.221)	2.144*** (0.221)	2.136*** (0.221)	0.305*** (0.029)	0.299*** (0.029)	0.299*** (0.026)	0.293*** (0.026)						
New missions	-4.863*** (1.898)	-5.146*** (1.897)	-4.082*** (1.892)	-4.380*** (1.891)	-1.006*** (0.267)	-1.022*** (0.267)	-1.014*** (0.264)	-1.032*** (0.264)	-0.018 (0.035)	-0.023 (0.035)	0.052 (0.032)	0.047 (0.032)						
Total violence	-0.424 (0.622)	-0.502 (0.621)	-0.031 (0.630)	-0.096 (0.630)	0.128 (0.088)	0.132 (0.088)	0.171* (0.088)	0.175*** (0.088)	-0.122*** (0.011)	-0.122*** (0.011)	-0.097*** (0.010)	-0.098*** (0.011)						
Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓						
Observations	93,401	93,401	89,726	89,726	93,403	93,403	89,732	89,732	93,402	93,402	89,729	89,729						
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.752	0.752	0.763	0.763	0.732	0.732	0.744	0.744	0.698	0.698	0.749	0.748						

Note: \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A6: Difference-in-Difference Analysis of Peacekeeper Types with Covariates and Fixed Effects

## **Elections in Troop-Contributing Countries**

Previous research suggests that advanced democratic troop-providers are more likely to withdraw from missions during (their own) election years (Duursma and Gledhill 2019). In Table A7, we re-estimate our models including dummies for time periods within six months or one year of the election date in the relevant contributing country as control variables. Our results remain substantively unchanged with respect to the analysis in the main text.

	Count of Peacekeepers				Count of Peacekeepers -Smoothed-			
Post-election	24.139*** (3.201)	24.257*** (3.206)	23.213*** (3.398)	23.249*** (3.403)	28.958*** (3.253)	29.119*** (3.258)	28.696*** (3.452)	28.772*** (3.456)
Polity score	3.535*** (0.526)	3.534*** (0.526)			3.560*** (0.534)	3.559*** (0.534)		
Polity × post-election	-3.998*** (0.433)	-3.999*** (0.433)			-4.323*** (0.441)	-4.324*** (0.441)		
Democracy			-25.266*** (5.706)	-25.215*** (5.708)			-21.753*** (5.789)	-21.671*** (5.791)
Democracy × post-election			-31.619*** (4.588)	-31.613*** (4.588)			-36.120*** (4.664)	-36.105*** (4.664)
Military expenditure	27.956*** (1.941)	27.899*** (1.945)	28.548*** (1.942)	28.532*** (1.945)	25.412*** (1.993)	25.322*** (1.997)	25.993*** (1.993)	25.948*** (1.998)
Refugees	19.998*** (0.618)	20.014*** (0.618)	20.142*** (0.618)	20.149*** (0.618)	19.810*** (0.618)	19.831*** (0.618)	19.932*** (0.617)	19.944*** (0.618)
Casualties	206.897*** (7.082)	206.883*** (7.082)	206.546*** (7.079)	206.537*** (7.080)	208.505*** (7.102)	208.485*** (7.102)	208.175*** (7.099)	208.160*** (7.100)
Civilian protection	89.043*** (4.163)	89.028*** (4.163)	88.745*** (4.154)	88.758*** (4.155)	80.808*** (4.203)	80.773*** (4.204)	80.237*** (4.194)	80.235*** (4.195)
Population growth	27.583*** (1.635)	27.535*** (1.640)	27.690*** (1.635)	27.687*** (1.639)	27.437*** (1.647)	27.362*** (1.652)	27.524*** (1.646)	27.495*** (1.651)
New missions	-5.793*** (1.941)	-5.845*** (1.944)	-6.071*** (1.940)	-6.083*** (1.943)	-5.331*** (1.937)	-5.410*** (1.940)	-5.632*** (1.936)	-5.669*** (1.939)
Total violence	0.282 (0.640)	0.277 (0.641)	0.216 (0.640)	0.201 (0.641)	0.807 (0.649)	0.806 (0.649)	0.758 (0.649)	0.747 (0.649)
Six-months to TCC election	6.245 (3.920)		8.118** (3.923)		5.911 (3.901)		7.777** (3.903)	
One-year to TCC election		2.352 (3.076)		4.189 (3.080)		1.706 (3.071)		3.542 (3.075)
Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	94,124	94,124	94,124	94,124	90,342	90,342	90,342	90,342
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.756	0.756	0.756	0.756	0.767	0.767	0.767	0.767

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A7: Difference-in-Difference Analysis with Contributor Country Elections and Fixed Effects

## Real GDP as an Indicator of Economic Performance and Cost of Training

Levin (2019) finds that peacekeeper fatalities have negative effect on the engagement of wealthy troop-providers in peacekeeping missions. The immediate withdrawal of wealthy troop-providers from UN missions stems from the higher costs associated with the training of soldiers, and the fact that UN monthly reimbursements are not as alluring to wealthy countries as they are to poor countries.

Another factor that might drive the differences between democratic and non-democratic TCCs has to do with the costs incurred from training peacekeepers. The United Nations provides a reimbursement to countries that contribute peacekeepers, but this reimbursement is not conditioned on the cost to train soldiers. That is, the UN reimburses all contributions at a standard rate, regardless of a country's training costs per soldier. Therefore, non-democracies will, on average, benefit more from the UN's monthly stipend when they send peacekeepers to UN missions, as they will tend to keep a greater surplus. For this reason, it is important to control for two potentially relevant factors: the real GDP of troop-providers and the cost per soldier (which we obtain by dividing the state's military expenditures in a given year by its number of military personnel).<sup>2</sup> In Table A8, we do control for these variables. Overall, our results remain robust to these alternative checks.

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<sup>2</sup>The data are acquired from the Correlates of War's National Material Capabilities (v6.0) (Greig and Enterline 2017)



	Count of Peacekeepers		Count of Peacekeepers -Smoothed-	
Polity score	38.615*** (3.478)	36.999*** (3.716)	44.612*** (3.529)	43.877*** (3.770)
Polity	4.303*** (0.558)		4.342*** (0.567)	
Polity × Post-election	-3.088*** (0.450)		-3.390*** (0.457)	
Democracy		-8.880 (6.124)		-4.229 (6.221)
Democracy × Post-election		-23.637*** (4.786)		-28.198*** (4.858)
Real GDP	-48.787*** (2.932)	-46.668*** (2.931)	-52.545*** (2.976)	-50.577*** (2.975)
Military expenditure	33.604*** (2.017)	33.758*** (2.018)	31.104*** (2.074)	31.260*** (2.075)
Cost of soldier	-4.525 (2.840)	-4.161 (2.843)	-4.085 (2.871)	-3.785 (2.874)
Refugees	16.055*** (0.661)	16.199*** (0.661)	15.490*** (0.662)	15.618*** (0.662)
Casualties	183.067*** (7.169)	182.783*** (7.170)	184.943*** (7.163)	184.696*** (7.164)
Civilian protection	128.056*** (4.917)	127.198*** (4.917)	120.325*** (4.953)	119.340*** (4.953)
Population growth	29.896*** (1.721)	29.744*** (1.721)	28.838*** (1.732)	28.667*** (1.732)
New missions	-8.689*** (2.326)	-8.943*** (2.327)	-8.020*** (2.324)	-8.288*** (2.324)
Total violence	-1.671** (0.684)	-1.740** (0.685)	-1.215* (0.694)	-1.269* (0.694)
Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	80,777	80,777	77,306	77,306
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.765	0.765	0.776	0.776

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A8: Difference-in-Difference Analysis with Covariates and Fixed Effects

## **Token Contribution**

We also address the concern that our results may be driven by the behavior of a few countries making only token contributions to peacekeeping missions. To ensure that this is not the case, we use Coleman's (2013) threshold of forty peacekeepers to identify and exclude token contributions. We then re-estimate our models reported in Table A9, using only those troop-providers that contributed at least forty-one individuals in a given mission-month. Our results remain substantively similar to those presented in the main text, suggesting that they are not driven by token contributors.

	Count of Peacekeepers		Count of Peacekeepers -Smoothed-	
Post-election	-11.859 (8.585)	-1.531 (9.271)	16.749* (8.672)	27.877*** (9.380)
Polity score	0.665 (1.480)		0.847 (1.495)	
Polity × post-election	-2.597** (1.268)		-2.822** (1.284)	
Democracy		-262.012*** (17.646)		-246.095*** (17.846)
Democracy × post-election		-16.880 (14.154)		-22.176 (14.356)
Military expenditure	70.188*** (8.474)	68.647*** (8.405)	66.937*** (8.624)	65.364*** (8.558)
Refugees	56.644*** (2.357)	55.216*** (2.333)	56.964*** (2.370)	55.558*** (2.348)
Casualties	82.796*** (10.756)	80.670*** (10.661)	88.943*** (10.864)	86.845*** (10.775)
Civilian protection	44.046*** (11.637)	56.138*** (11.448)	42.324*** (11.712)	53.859*** (11.525)
Population growth	13.487** (6.501)	4.258 (6.466)	17.595*** (6.575)	8.379 (6.544)
New missions	-20.039*** (5.777)	-20.642*** (5.725)	-19.313*** (5.800)	-19.958*** (5.751)
Total violence	7.338*** (1.876)	7.159*** (1.860)	7.685*** (1.915)	7.511*** (1.900)
Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	20,798	20,798	20,157	20,157
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.838	0.841	0.840	0.843

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A9: Difference-in-Difference Analysis with Covariates and Fixed Effects (Excluding Token Contributions)

## Alternative Approach to Withdrawal

In Table A10, we entertain the potential alternative explanation that casualties at the peacekeeper level might affect the engagement of democratic troop-providers. To that end, we take the lag of contributor-mission-month level peacekeeper casualties and interact it with regime type variables.

The results for the interaction terms in Table A10 show that advanced democracies are generally not deterred by violence targeting their own military personnel. Contrary to the initial expectations, we find a statistically significant and negative effect for the interaction. However, the *overall marginal effect* remains positive. In other words, both democracies and non-democracies increase their contributions in response to casualties, but democratic states do so to a lesser degree. Overall, these results suggest that our findings are not driven by peacekeeper responses to casualties.

	Count of Peacekeepers		Count of Peacekeepers -Smoothed-	
Casualties	212.713*** (7.227)	235.963*** (8.580)	212.954*** (7.225)	235.354*** (8.560)
Polity score	1.262*** (0.456)		1.104** (0.461)	
Polity × casualties	-4.948*** (1.209)		-4.309*** (1.215)	
Democracy		-46.485*** (4.599)		-46.223*** (4.642)
Democracy × casualties		-92.511*** (15.142)		-87.926*** (15.276)
Military expenditure	27.099*** (1.932)	27.555*** (1.932)	24.300*** (1.983)	24.687*** (1.982)
Refugees	20.183*** (0.615)	20.369*** (0.615)	20.048*** (0.615)	20.208*** (0.615)
Civilian protection	89.703*** (4.079)	91.360*** (4.067)	82.409*** (4.119)	83.842*** (4.106)
Population growth	27.748*** (1.620)	28.104*** (1.619)	27.815*** (1.633)	28.132*** (1.632)
New missions	-5.807*** (1.939)	-6.107*** (1.937)	-5.306*** (1.934)	-5.623*** (1.933)
Total violence	0.329 (0.640)	0.250 (0.640)	0.893 (0.649)	0.835 (0.648)
Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	94,124	94,124	90,342	90,342
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.756	0.756	0.766	0.767

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A10: Alternative Approach to Withdrawal with Fixed Effects

## **Controlling for the Authorized Personnel by the UNSC**

We acknowledge the fact that the number of UN peacekeepers operating in target countries can be affected by the UNSC's operational decisions, as well. To be clear, the UNSC has the authority to determine the maximum number of peacekeepers stationed in target countries. This decision may vary depending on the target country's background and the budget constraints. In this respect, in order to alleviate the concerns that our results might be driven by the UNSC's decisions rather than troop-providers, we further control for the number of authorized personnel by the UNSC.

Contributor-level variables					
Statistic	Number of observations	Mean	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Total peacekeepers	63,135	166.8	525.9	0.0	7,243.0
Observers	62,645	5.2	7.9	0.0	791.0
Troops	62,645	145.5	504.7	0.0	7,243.0
Police	62,645	17.2	59.0	0.0	845.0
Post-election	64,041	0.7	0.5	0	1
Polity score	62,821	4.9	5.2	−10.0	10.0
Democracy	62,821	0.5	0.5	0.0	1.0
Distance	64,041	8.5	0.7	4.8	9.9
Military spending	55,375	0.9	0.9	−1.5	3.4
GDP per capita	61,347	6.7	0.9	4.6	8.1
Integrated missions	64,041	0.9	0.3	0	1
Refugees	63,723	11.3	2.7	0.0	14.7
Population growth	64,041	2.0	1.6	−9.0	5.5
Casualties	63,083	0.01	0.2	0.0	25.0
Civilian protection	64,041	0.2	0.4	0	1
EU member	64,041	0.2	0.4	0	1
AU member	64,041	0.3	0.5	0	1
New missions	64,041	0.1	0.4	0	9
Total violence	62,952	2.1	2.3	0.0	13.1
Six-months to TCC election	64,041	0.03	0.2	0	1
One-year to TCC election	64,041	0.1	0.2	0	1

Table A11: Descriptive statistics (Officially Authorized Personnel Sample)

We acquire the data on the formally-authorized personnel from Passmore, Shannon and Hart (2018). The authors collect from 21 missions in 13 African countries between 1990 and 2010, which explains why the sample we use in the upcoming empirical models has less number of observations (see descriptive statistics on Table A11).

We begin with the models excluding potential confounders in order to evaluate the relationship at the highest number of observation. In Table A12, we control for the number of formally-authorized personnel in models 1, 2, 5, and 6. In all models, we capture negative and statistically significant results for the interaction terms.



	Count of Peacekeepers				Count of Peacekeepers -Smoothed-			
	Authorization cont.		Authorization not cont.		Authorization cont.		Authorization not cont.	
Post-election	77.442*** (4.075)	71.709*** (4.298)	61.769*** (4.234)	61.306*** (4.458)	80.641*** (4.098)	75.196*** (4.315)	64.514*** (4.304)	64.164*** (4.524)
Polity score	8.186*** (0.812)		6.427*** (0.800)		8.754*** (0.818)		6.736*** (0.813)	
Polity × post-election	-7.092*** (0.574)		-7.438*** (0.603)		-7.284*** (0.577)		-7.706*** (0.613)	
Democracy		33.580*** (8.963)		-17.297** (8.410)		38.791*** (9.022)		-19.877** (8.523)
Democracy × post-election		-50.920*** (6.040)		-61.709*** (6.348)		-53.280*** (6.050)		-64.219*** (6.426)
Authorized personnel	0.019*** (0.0003)	0.019*** (0.0003)			0.018*** (0.0003)	0.018*** (0.0003)		
Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	48,098	48,098	61,923	61,923	45,733	45,733	58,745	58,745
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.770	0.770	0.705	0.705	0.788	0.787	0.723	0.723

Note: \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A12: Difference-in-Difference Analysis with Control for Authorized Personnel

Next, we add our control variables to the models and repeat the panel data estimations. While this results in a decreased number of observations, we still find similar results for the interaction terms.

	Count of Peacekeepers				Count of Peacekeepers -Smoothed-			
	Authorization cont.		Authorization not cont.		Authorization cont.		Authorization not cont.	
Post-election	39.023*** (4.082)	30.130*** (4.364)	36.439*** (4.284)	34.732*** (4.534)	43.543*** (4.076)	35.773*** (4.349)	40.337*** (4.318)	39.035*** (4.563)
Polity score	2.889*** (0.754)		2.838*** (0.786)		3.141*** (0.755)		3.127*** (0.793)	
Polity × post-election	-2.965*** (0.553)		-4.981*** (0.605)		-3.120*** (0.553)		-5.326*** (0.610)	
Democracy		-9.366 (8.700)		-52.333*** (8.377)		-0.025 (8.709)		-46.865*** (8.439)
Democracy × post-election		-7.606 (5.940)		-37.271*** (6.424)		-11.550* (5.918)		-41.599*** (6.463)
Military expenditure	41.003*** (3.788)	40.780*** (3.788)	45.406*** (3.681)	45.548*** (3.677)	39.234*** (3.894)	38.891*** (3.894)	37.813*** (3.769)	37.782*** (3.765)
Refugees	-0.174 (0.840)	-0.080 (0.839)	19.698*** (0.795)	19.977*** (0.794)	-0.150 (0.827)	-0.069 (0.826)	19.294*** (0.794)	19.541*** (0.793)
Casualties	147.404*** (8.657)	147.642*** (8.660)	218.276*** (9.577)	217.949*** (9.567)	144.556*** (8.520)	144.754*** (8.524)	215.958*** (9.533)	215.603*** (9.524)
Population growth	-0.460 (2.720)	-0.685 (2.722)	26.928*** (2.537)	27.497*** (2.535)	0.713 (2.715)	0.366 (2.716)	25.332*** (2.542)	25.826*** (2.540)
New missions	-3.563 (3.252)	-3.732 (3.253)	-4.025 (3.108)	-4.484 (3.105)	-3.578 (3.230)	-3.746 (3.230)	-3.850 (3.100)	-4.362 (3.097)
Total violence	-5.606*** (0.807)	-5.664*** (0.808)	1.293 (0.878)	1.105 (0.878)	-5.806*** (0.808)	-5.832*** (0.809)	1.356 (0.886)	1.194 (0.885)
Authorized personnel	0.019*** (0.0004)	0.019*** (0.0004)			0.018*** (0.0004)	0.018*** (0.0004)		
Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	40,748	40,748	52,537	52,537	39,551	39,551	50,860	50,860
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.818	0.817	0.733	0.733	0.828	0.828	0.743	0.744

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A13: Difference-in-Difference Analysis with Control for Authorized Personnel and Co-  
variates

In Tables A14, A15, and A16, we further control for the number of formally-authorized personnel in the models with disaggregated peacekeeper types. In Table A14, we show identical results suggesting that advanced democracies withdraw troops after host-country elections. The findings are consistent in almost all models in Table A15 for police contributions and in Table A16 for observer contributions.

	Count of Troops				Count of Troops -Smoothed-			
	Authorization cont.		Authorization not cont.		Authorization cont.		Authorization not cont.	
Post-election	27.141*** (4.133)	15.904*** (4.373)	28.989*** (4.261)	25.324*** (4.470)	31.384*** (4.119)	21.151*** (4.348)	32.409*** (4.290)	28.986*** (4.493)
Polity score	2.515*** (0.749)		2.298*** (0.774)		2.820*** (0.749)		2.607*** (0.780)	
Polity × post-election	-2.551*** (0.560)		-4.393*** (0.604)		-2.729*** (0.559)		-4.733*** (0.609)	
Democracy		-15.221* (8.567)		-56.624*** (8.188)		-5.787 (8.563)		-51.389*** (8.238)
Democracy × post-election		0.458 (5.937)		-28.482*** (6.352)		-3.514 (5.902)		-32.483*** (6.380)
Military expenditure	38.818*** (3.768)	38.743*** (3.769)	41.678*** (3.597)	41.881*** (3.593)	37.231*** (3.860)	37.064*** (3.860)	34.330*** (3.674)	34.361*** (3.670)
Refugees	0.204 (0.822)	0.293 (0.821)	18.700*** (0.771)	18.967*** (0.770)	0.256 (0.807)	0.336 (0.807)	18.322*** (0.769)	18.559*** (0.768)
Casualties	143.024*** (8.416)	143.228*** (8.417)	212.274*** (9.248)	211.933*** (9.239)	140.280*** (8.271)	140.451*** (8.274)	210.331*** (9.199)	209.966*** (9.191)
Population growth	0.735 (2.675)	0.640 (2.676)	26.328*** (2.456)	26.935*** (2.454)	1.934 (2.665)	1.725 (2.666)	25.001*** (2.459)	25.535*** (2.457)
New missions	-2.765 (3.267)	-2.872 (3.268)	-3.572 (3.067)	-3.934 (3.064)	-2.891 (3.241)	-2.996 (3.241)	-3.560 (3.057)	-3.964 (3.054)
Total violence	-5.259*** (0.796)	-5.341*** (0.797)	1.037 (0.860)	0.817 (0.860)	-5.491*** (0.797)	-5.546*** (0.797)	1.053 (0.867)	0.852 (0.867)
Authorized personnel	0.018*** (0.0004)	0.018*** (0.0004)			0.017*** (0.0004)	0.017*** (0.0004)		
Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	40,309	40,309	52,098	52,098	39,160	39,160	50,467	50,467
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.814	0.814	0.728	0.729	0.825	0.825	0.740	0.740

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A14: Difference-in-Difference Analysis of Troops with Control for Authorized Personnel and Covariates

	Count of Police				Count of Police -Smoothed-			
	Authorization cont.		Authorization not cont.		Authorization cont.		Authorization not cont.	
Post-election	11.692*** (0.453)	12.809*** (0.478)	9.286*** (0.486)	10.142*** (0.510)	12.313*** (0.452)	13.554*** (0.477)	10.109*** (0.489)	11.045*** (0.513)
Polity score	0.398*** (0.082)		0.690*** (0.088)		0.365*** (0.082)		0.696*** (0.089)	
Polity × post-election	-0.611*** (0.061)		-0.801*** (0.069)		-0.607*** (0.061)		-0.832*** (0.069)	
Democracy		4.830*** (0.937)		3.661*** (0.935)		5.076*** (0.939)		4.154*** (0.940)
Democracy × post-election		-7.825*** (0.649)		-8.886*** (0.725)		-8.065*** (0.647)		-9.378*** (0.728)
Military expenditure	2.817*** (0.413)	2.783*** (0.412)	3.539*** (0.410)	3.569*** (0.410)	2.694*** (0.424)	2.657*** (0.423)	3.180*** (0.419)	3.209*** (0.419)
Refugees	-0.280*** (0.090)	-0.281*** (0.090)	1.025*** (0.088)	1.042*** (0.088)	-0.293*** (0.089)	-0.296*** (0.088)	0.971*** (0.088)	0.986*** (0.088)
Casualties	3.839*** (0.921)	3.890*** (0.921)	4.764*** (1.055)	4.764*** (1.055)	3.843*** (0.908)	3.893*** (0.907)	4.548*** (1.049)	4.548*** (1.048)
Population growth	-0.750** (0.293)	-0.795*** (0.293)	0.071 (0.280)	0.079 (0.280)	-0.938*** (0.292)	-0.975*** (0.292)	-0.229 (0.280)	-0.220 (0.280)
New missions	-0.741** (0.358)	-0.745** (0.357)	-0.872** (0.350)	-0.911*** (0.350)	-0.657* (0.356)	-0.658* (0.355)	-0.771** (0.348)	-0.811** (0.348)
Total violence	-0.269*** (0.087)	-0.263*** (0.087)	0.160 (0.098)	0.158 (0.098)	-0.266*** (0.087)	-0.259*** (0.087)	0.203** (0.099)	0.202** (0.099)
Authorized personnel	0.001*** (0.00004)	0.001*** (0.00004)			0.001*** (0.00004)	0.001*** (0.00004)		
Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	40,309	40,309	52,098	52,098	39,160	39,160	50,467	50,467
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.791	0.791	0.714	0.714	0.799	0.799	0.721	0.722

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A15: Difference-in-Difference Analysis of Police with Control for Authorized Personnel and Covariates

	Count of Observers				Count of Observers -Smoothed-			
	Authorization cont.		Authorization not cont.		Authorization cont.		Authorization not cont.	
Post-election	0.595*** (0.062)	0.790*** (0.066)	0.300*** (0.061)	0.371*** (0.064)	0.704*** (0.059)	0.876*** (0.062)	0.358*** (0.059)	0.396*** (0.062)
Polity score	0.166*** (0.011)		0.137*** (0.011)		0.167*** (0.011)		0.136*** (0.011)	
Polity × post-election	-0.037*** (0.008)		-0.082*** (0.009)		-0.033*** (0.008)		-0.082*** (0.008)	
Democracy		1.149*** (0.129)		1.104*** (0.118)		1.050*** (0.122)		0.992*** (0.114)
Democracy × post-election		-0.645*** (0.089)		-0.868*** (0.092)		-0.556*** (0.084)		-0.793*** (0.088)
Military expenditure	0.501*** (0.057)	0.509*** (0.057)	1.200*** (0.052)	1.203*** (0.052)	0.274*** (0.055)	0.283*** (0.055)	0.969*** (0.051)	0.972*** (0.051)
Refugees	-0.128*** (0.012)	-0.121*** (0.012)	0.182*** (0.011)	0.183*** (0.011)	-0.128*** (0.012)	-0.121*** (0.012)	0.165*** (0.011)	0.167*** (0.011)
Casualties	0.517*** (0.126)	0.514*** (0.127)	1.203*** (0.133)	1.205*** (0.133)	0.415*** (0.118)	0.412*** (0.118)	1.079*** (0.127)	1.080*** (0.127)
Population growth	-0.082** (0.040)	-0.101** (0.040)	0.378*** (0.035)	0.370*** (0.035)	-0.078** (0.038)	-0.098** (0.038)	0.363*** (0.034)	0.356*** (0.034)
New missions	-0.028 (0.049)	-0.040 (0.049)	-0.097** (0.044)	-0.101** (0.044)	-0.054 (0.046)	-0.066 (0.046)	-0.112*** (0.042)	-0.116*** (0.042)
Total violence	-0.151*** (0.012)	-0.150*** (0.012)	0.008 (0.012)	0.009 (0.012)	-0.104*** (0.011)	-0.103*** (0.011)	0.053*** (0.012)	0.053*** (0.012)
Authorized personnel	0.0004*** (0.00001)	0.0004*** (0.00001)			0.0003*** (0.00001)	0.0003*** (0.00001)		
Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	40,309	40,309	52,098	52,098	39,160	39,160	50,467	50,467
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.823	0.823	0.747	0.747	0.846	0.846	0.770	0.770

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A16: Difference-in-Difference Analysis of Observers with Control for Authorized Personnel and Covariates

## Timing of Withdrawal

Our theory is not explicit about the dynamics of withdrawal, but given that we view elections as opportunities for withdrawal, we would expect democratic states to take advantage relatively quickly. To examine the dynamics in a bit greater detail, we ran a few supplementary analyses in which we compared troop levels at various points to pre-election levels. Table A17 compares country-level contributions in the first three months following an election to average levels preceding the election.<sup>3</sup> While the interaction term is negative and significant, as expected, we can see that the marginal effect is actually slightly positive. We don't think this is particularly surprising, as there are often tasks to be done in the immediate aftermath, such as preparing for runoffs or dealing with potential spoilers. Moreover, it can be difficult for countries to organize a safe and orderly withdrawal in a short time frame. These safety concerns are why the War Powers Resolution, for example, provides the U.S. president with additional time to withdraw troops if he fails to secure Congressional approval.

We begin to see withdrawal dynamics in the second ninety days following the election. As Table A18 demonstrates, we still see a substantially larger effect for democracies (our interaction term), and the marginal effect is now negative. This means that the drawdown really begins in months four through six. We see not only the removal of the new peacekeepers brought in during the immediate post-election months, but a negative marginal effect relative to pre-election levels as well.

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<sup>3</sup>We drop all country-months not within our comparison ranges.



	Count of Peacekeepers		Count of Peacekeepers -Smoothed-	
Post-election (1-3 months)	39.677*** (5.937)	39.621*** (6.428)	45.679*** (5.891)	45.650*** (6.383)
Polity score	1.559** (0.790)		1.503* (0.795)	
Polity × Post-election (1-3 months)	-3.165*** (0.797)		-3.495*** (0.794)	
Democracy		26.857*** (9.315)		30.291*** (9.402)
Democracy × Post-election (1-3 months)		-28.935*** (8.522)		-32.042*** (8.493)
Military expenditures	99.373*** (3.900)	99.214*** (3.900)	97.737*** (4.056)	97.577*** (4.056)
Cost of soldier	26.762*** (3.831)	26.270*** (3.831)	29.073*** (3.844)	28.526*** (3.845)
Refugees	7.781** (3.210)	7.691** (3.211)	5.376 (3.343)	5.204 (3.344)
Casualties	147.959*** (9.417)	148.061*** (9.417)	145.365*** (9.357)	145.444*** (9.356)
Population growth	44.194*** (3.368)	43.779*** (3.370)	44.674*** (3.369)	44.246*** (3.370)
New missions	-5.871** (2.932)	-5.909** (2.931)	-7.061** (2.917)	-7.103** (2.917)
Total violence	-5.790*** (0.836)	-5.735*** (0.836)	-4.625*** (0.844)	-4.559*** (0.844)
Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	32,329	32,329	30,498	30,498
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.822	0.822	0.833	0.833

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A17: One to three months

	Count of Peacekeepers		Count of Peacekeepers -Smoothed-	
Post-election (4-6 months)	38.183*** (6.549)	36.444*** (7.016)	45.659*** (6.406)	44.205*** (6.862)
Polity score	1.713** (0.789)		1.759** (0.788)	
Polity × Post-election (4-6 months)	-4.557*** (0.884)		-4.440*** (0.865)	
Democracy		28.352*** (9.284)		31.164*** (9.341)
Democracy × Post-election (4-6 months)		-38.984*** (9.309)		-38.454*** (9.103)
Military expenditures	94.805*** (3.884)	94.598*** (3.884)	93.196*** (4.027)	92.995*** (4.027)
Cost of soldier	26.933*** (3.803)	26.326*** (3.803)	28.792*** (3.800)	28.149*** (3.801)
Refugees	11.013*** (3.277)	10.925*** (3.278)	7.493** (3.314)	7.354** (3.315)
Casualties	138.390*** (9.601)	138.198*** (9.602)	132.978*** (9.526)	132.759*** (9.527)
Population growth	42.359*** (3.361)	41.874*** (3.364)	42.687*** (3.356)	42.190*** (3.357)
New missions	-8.431*** (2.944)	-8.417*** (2.944)	-6.576** (2.927)	-6.562** (2.926)
Total violence	-6.982*** (0.821)	-6.938*** (0.822)	-5.748*** (0.826)	-5.696*** (0.826)
Fixed Effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	32,166	32,166	30,426	30,426
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.821	0.821	0.832	0.832

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table A18: Four to six months

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